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Trump's tariff’s impact on Africa  
and the ambiguous role of African agency  
 
 
Dirk Kohnert 1 
 
 
The international discussion of Trump's dispute over import tariffs for steel, 
aluminum and even cars is so far focused on the big global players. However, 
African countries suffer in particular from the planned punitive tariffs, similar to 
the famous African proverb: ‘When elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers’. 
After years of talk on partnership for economic development (AGOA, Cotonou 
Agreement, EPAs, etc) Trump’s tariffs mean a severe blow to participatory 
foreign trade and sustainable industrialization in Africa. Egypt and South Africa 
for example, the potentially most affected African countries, face massive job 
losses and earning opportunities, with all the consequences that this entails for 
their already fragile economy and the population in dire poverty. Trump’s 
intervention thus joins the continued power politics of former colonial powers vis 
à vis Africa. Nevertheless, despite these asymmetric power relations, unfair 
trade relations and the desolate state of African infant industries are not 
necessarily due to externalities. More often than not they are home-made. 
African agency plays an ambiguous role in enhancing participatory trade and 
indigenous industrialization. 
 
JEL classification: F13, F51, F52, F6, H21, N 67, N 77, P16, P52, Z1   
 
 
The current debate on Trump’s tariffs focuses on the big global players and 
competitors of the US. Africa plays virtually no role in the international scholarly 
perception about the impact of US protective tariffs on imported steel, aluminum and 
cars. Nevertheless, there are such effects and these are anything than peanuts, as 
will be shown in the following.  
 
 
1. Impact of Trump’s tariffs on African trade  
 
At least since the derogatory comments of the American President on Africa in 
January 2018, in which Donald Trump described African states as "shitholes", the 
weight he attached to Africa became clear beyond doubt2. Evidently, from his point of 
view, America's greatness is based on other spheres of influence than Africa. This is 
in disregard to the fact that Africa and the African diaspora contributed significantly to 
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the making of the United States, to its development into the country that it is today, as 
Clayson Monyela, a spokesman for the South African Department of International 
Relations and Cooperation underlined recently3. Trump rather concentrates on global 
competitors, such as China, Russia and Europe in order to ‘put America first again’.  
 
In absolute terms Trump may be right. The dimension of imports of steel and 
aluminum from Africa might be negligible in relation to overall imports and its 
supposed negative effects on employment of US working-class whites in Rust Belt 
states, such as Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin and Iowa, who belong to the 
clientele of Trump’s republican voters.  
 
However, Africa is far more dependent on overseas trade than other economic 
regions and global players, such as the EU or North America that handle 63% and 
40% respectively of their business with their regional neighbors, like the EU member 
states, Mexico and Canada. Major reasons of Africa’s dependency are the 
fragmented intra-African market, decades of stagnant regional and continental 
integration, high transaction costs, and corresponding tariff and non-tariff barriers to 
trade. Most of these barriers are at least partially due to rival neo-colonial foreign 
trade networks of anglo-, franco- and lusophone African countries, like that of the 
French ‘Messieurs Afrique’ (Kohnert, 2005).  
 
Africa’s infant industries rely heavily on foreign trade in view of its limited local and 
regional markets. Intra-African trade accounts for far below 20% of total African 
foreign trade. The Pan-African Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) that was recently 
negotiated on a special AU summit in Kigali (Rwanda, 21 March 2018) by 44 African 
states is not likely to change this situation in the foreseeable future. CFTA is 
supposed to liberalize intra-African services completely and 90% of trade in goods. 
Yet, the common external tariffs have not yet been negotiated, last, but not least, 
because of controversial EU-Africa trade agreements (EPAs, Kohnert 2015), and 
since some of the major African countries, for example South Africa, Nigeria and 
Uganda, have not yet joined the CFTA.  
 
Finally, unfair trade relations to the disadvantage of African countries overshadow 
African foreign trade since colonial times. Africa is still integrated asymmetrically into 
global trade. Raw material and agricultural exports on the one hand and capital 
goods imports on the other still dominate African foreign trade. One of the origins of 
Africa's current inability to benefit fully from the expansion of world trade lies in the 
colonial division of labor, the consequences of which persist in economic structures 
far more than in other continents (Barratt Brown, 2007). Under these conditions, the 
free trade ideology of the Bretton Woods Institutions, propagated for decades by 
Structural Adjustment Programs of the IMF, rather conserved the status quo than 
sustainable African growth. This the more so, as Africa’s commodity prices have 
fallen in international markets since the 1970s, whereas at the same time consumer 
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prices have risen. The divergences increased dramatically because of the 
asymmetric response of domestic consumer prices to movements in world prices4. 
This imbalance had been commonly attributed to trade restrictions and rising 
processing costs. But in reality it appeared to be caused largely by the behavior of 
international trading companies large enough to dominate most commodity markets 
(Morriset 1997). All this makes for the volatility of African foreign trade relations that 
would still be aggravated by Trump’s tariffs. 
 
Still, Africa is mostly ignored in the international scholarly discussion about the effects 
of Trump's protective tariffs on steel (25%), aluminum (10%), cars and other imports 
(see table 2 & 3, and Map 3, Appendix). Trump’s “trade war” meanwhile extended to 
far more than steel and aluminum. Concerning US steel imports, South Africa ranks 
only 20th on the global list of steel exporting countries, far behind Germany (8) or 
China (10) (see Table 1, Map 1). However, in Africa there are also countries and 
sections of the population that would suffer significantly from the new protective tariffs 
planned by the US government supposedly to safeguard ‘national security’, as will be 
shown below.  
 
Besides, the following examples of African countries, who have little power to 
retaliate, show that Trump’s protectionism is inspired not only by economic and 
‘national security’ reasons, which may be allowed for by WTO regulations, but also by 
considerations to enforce good conduct of trading partners in order to ‘make America 
great again’ which are obviously illegal according to WTO rules5. It went to such 
length to punishing Africans for refusing second-hand American clothes. The case in 
question concerns Rwanda that, like many other African countries, was once a proud 
producer of home-made textiles. But decades of mismanagement, instability, the 
market liberalization of the 1980s and the subsequent global competition with cheap 
Chinese imports and overstocking African markets with used clothing from overseas 
brought African local textile industry to its knees6. Therefore, the East African 
Community (EAC) decided in 2015 that second-hand apparel would be banned from 
their markets from 2019. In retaliation, the US threatened in 2017 to remove four East 
African countries, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda, from the African Growth 
and Opportunity Act (AGOA)7, because its declared aim is to eliminate trade barriers. 
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Whereas subsequently Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania backed out, Rwanda did not, in 
order to protect its nascent garment and textile industry8.  
 
 
Steel and aluminum-production and –imports to the USA  
 
The USA is the world largest importer of steel and aluminum. In 2017, it imported 
34.6 metric tons (mmt) steel. Due to growing productivity, the US is producing more 
and more steel with fewer and fewer workers. Just under 300,000 workers were 
employed in the US steel sector in 2015, with a decreasing trend, to the current level 
of 8.5% of the workforce in the manufacturing sector. The volume of imported steel in 
the United States in 2016 was 15% higher than that of Germany, the second largest 
steel importer in the world. Although steel imports to the USA were distributed over 
85 countries, just four exporting countries, Canada, China, Russia and the United 
Arab Emirates were by far the most important suppliers (75%) of steel to the USA, 
none of them African.  
 
With regard to aluminum the dependency of the USA is even more pronounced (map 
2) and this dependency increased steadily within the past decades. About 90% of its 
aluminum for products, as diverse as beer cans and aircraft, the US covers by now 
by imports. While there existed still 23 aluminum smelters in the US in 1993, there 
are only five today. Just one of them is capable of producing high purity aluminum, 
which is needed for aircraft construction9. However, the jobs in the aluminum smelter 
industry which Trump wants to protect constitute only 3% of total jobs in the 
aluminum industry. The remaining 97% (about 156,000) are in the downstream 
manufacturing industry 10. The US business already warned against an ugly trade-off. 
That is, increasing tariffs would also raise prices in the US automotive and aviation 
industries, making their jobs less competitive internationally. 
 
Economists worldwide warn against a trade war (Lim, L. 2018; Malawer, 2018; 
Pelkmann, 2018; Peterson, 2018). They do acknowledge that the global 
overproduction of steel and aluminum is a problem that needs to be solved. 
Nonetheless they do also raise concerns that in restricting free markets rules by 
unilateral taxation of imports as envisaged by Trump, the Trump administration not 
only violates WTO rules, but would also cause lasting damage to the global 
economy. Moreover, economists caution that Trump's protectionism could spread to 
other industries and countries11. However, they admit that the world trade system, 
                                                 
8
, see: BBC-new, ibid; Dahir, A.L. & Kazeern, Y. (2018): Weaving your own - Trump’s “trade war” includes 
punishing Africans for refusing second-hand American clothes. Quartz Africa, April 5, 2018 and Harris, Grant 
T. (2018): The U.S. is punishing Rwanda for rejecting our old jeans and T-shirts. It’s a shortsighted move. Petty 
trade squabbles and a general neglect of Africa by the U.S. imperil larger opportunities. Washington Post, June 
6, 2018.  
9
 Steel Imports Report: United States, March 2018, US-International Trade Administration, Global steel trade 
monitor.  
10
 Washington Post, 01.03.2018  
11
 US-Strafzölle - Ifo warnt: Protektionismus kann sich ausweiten. Ifo-Institut, München,  19.03.2018 
5 
 
and in particular US-EU trade relations, urgently need to be reformed, especially as 
the EU has built more trade barriers in recent decades than the US12. Moreover, 
African economists give notice of collateral damages of a possible trade war between 
the major global players, notably a negative impact on productive capacity and jobs 
for Africa’s infant industries 13.     
 
 
Steel production in the US and Africa in comparison  
 
The steel production (in 1,000 tons) in the USA in January 2018 was 6,822, i.e. about 
ten times as high as in Egypt (660) or South Africa (577). Other major African steel 
exporters like Libya (48) and Morocco 45 (Aug. 2017) were far behind in third and 
fourth place, respectively 14. Worldwide, South Africa and Egypt rank 22nd and 27th 
globally in steel production, that is, far behind China, the world's largest steel 
producer, with 808.4 million mmt or 50% of world production. Still, barely 2% of the 
steel imported into the US last year came from China15. Share levels in aluminum 
were a bit higher, but not predominant either. The vast majority of Chinese steel 
shipments went to other countries. Trade diversion as result of Trump’s protective 
tariffs could lead to the dreaded crowing out and cut-throat competition with respect 
to the infant African steel industry.  
 
However, compared to the US, China or Europe, the metalworking industry in African 
countries, such as South Africa or Egypt, has a significantly higher importance for  its 
domestic economy and sustainable growth. In total, the manufacturing industry in 
South Africa had 1,213,560 employees in 2014, of which the largest share was in the 
metalworking industry, namely 257,098 or 21%16. In Egypt, the total number 
employed in industry17 in 2015 was 25% of all economic sectors, with its steel 
industry considered to embody the nation’s economic resilience18 . 
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Steel and aluminum production in Egypt and South Africa and US imports 
 
Egypt  
 
Egypt exported about 170,000 tons or $ 102 million worth of steel to the United 
States in 2017, accounting for about 3% of total US imports, with rising tendency. 
The potential for a further increase in Egyptian steel exports was estimated by the 
metallurgical chamber of industry of Cairo (MIC) as promising19. Not only did the MIC 
plead to be exempted from Trump’s duties, she also hoped for a crowding out at the 
expense of third parties. According to the MIC, Egyptian exports to the United States 
could even continue to increase and take the place of those countries that were 
unlikely to be exempted from US tariffs, such as Turkey. The latter exported 2.5 m 
tons of steel to the US in 2017. Egypt's total foreign trade with the US rose 13% in 
last year, from $ 4.7 billion in 2016 to $ 5.5 billion in 2017. Egypt's Trade Minister 
Tarek Kabil recently stated that his country's steel exports accounted for only 6% of 
total exports and that there would be still plenty of room for maneuver. Yet this 
apparently was wishful thinking, because Egypt was on the list of 12 countries20 of 
the US Department of Commerce to be punished for alleged dumping or unfair trade 
with especially high tariffs. According to the US-report on "The Impact of Imports of 
Steel on National Security", the first option embraced a global protective tariff of 24%. 
The second option included Egypt, along with 11 other states. For these 12 
countries, a penalty of at least 53% on steel imports was recommended. Egypt would 
thus be much more affected by the punitive tariffs than, for example, the EU. 
Thousands of steel workers would be unemployed. Egypt could relieve itself from US 
import duties – if at all - only with extraordinary foreign policy concessions, for 
example concerning Israel, which - because of Egypt’s lower bargaining power - 
would probably be far more serious than similar concessions of the EU or Germany. 
 
 
South Africa  
 
South Africa, also benefitting from AGOA, is the most important African exporter of 
steel to the U.S. South African steel imports to the US totaled $ 950 m, and aluminum 
exports $ 375 m in 2017. Though, they represented only about 1.4% of total US 
imports, but a quarter of all South African US exports. Losing the US market could 
put 300 000 tons of steel production at risk, along with some 7 500 jobs in the steel 
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and manufacturing supply chain. The US market for aluminum produced in South 
Africa were valued at $375-million, accounting for 1.6% of US imports 21. This 
illustrates quite well the asymmetric distribution of the risk to lose jobs in both 
countries. According to the South African Trade and Industry Department (DTI), its 
exports were not an unfair trade or a threat to US industry or jobs. Rather, they would 
serve as input to the US manufacturing industry, helping to create jobs and increase 
US production22. Nevertheless, South Africa was also on the list of the 12 countries 
that were to be subject to particularly high punitive tariffs, mentioned before. Amongst 
the steel companies concerned were for example ArcerlorMittal SA. and Hulamin, a 
Pietermaritzburg-based company that supplies aluminum products for Elon Musk's 
Tesla (the Californian electric-car maker), that could also be affected. ArcelorMittal's 
and Hulamin's share prices lost 5% and 4%, respectively, on the black Friday after 
the announcement. The local South African steel industry also feared that the US 
could use the ongoing protective tariff discussion as a springboard to levy tariffs on 
processed products, especially motor vehicles. Yet, vehicle manufacturers such as 
BMW and VW South Africa downplayed the problem. VW for example was pointing 
out that they did not export cars from South Africa to the US. Nevertheless, the 
government in Pretoria did apply for exemption from US tariffs in March 201823. This, 
the more so, since the South African steel industry was already suffering from global 
overproduction and low world market prices and jobs were under massive risks. 
Trump’s threats also influenced the exchange rate of South African’s currency, which 
depended on car exports. The Rand gave up overnight on R11.88.  
 
African experts fear that - according to the African proverb, if two elephants are 
fighting, it is the grass that suffers - especially the globally smaller countries could 
suffer most from the trade conflict between the US, and global players like China or 
the EU, notably Germany, that were singled out by Trump for allegedly having "taken 
advantage" of the United States24. This all the more so, as South Africa is not such a 
significant US ally that it would be exempted from sanctions, such as Canada, 
Mexico, Australia, Argentina or South Korea. The South African government learned 
end of April that the US had not granted South Africa an exemption on its increased 
steel and aluminum tariffs from across-the-board 25% steel and 10% aluminum 
tariffs. Just before, SA had offered to restrict exports of these metals to the US to 
70% of the 2017 level, but the Americans had turned down this proposal. Apparently, 
this was also a foreign policy motivated retaliation measure of the US after its recent 
announcement that it wanted to cut foreign aid to countries like South Africa who 
don't vote with it at the UN 25. All the more, Trump announced end of May that the US 
Commerce Department was investigating possible trade actions on imported vehicles 
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of about 25% tax on imports for cars and trucks. In 2017, the US imported almost 
37,000 cars from South Africa. However, it ranked only 13th on the list of 15 top car 
importers in 2017 (when it had reduced car exports to the U.S. by 50%; see table 3). 
Thus, the US was the second biggest importer of SA vehicles, after the UK 
(54,400)26. Up to now, South African car manufacturers had duty-free access to the 
US market because of AGOA – which apparently will be also questioned by Trump in 
the long run. 
 
Accordingly, South Africa will be disproportionately affected both in terms of jobs and 
productive capacity, although the SA-trade department pointed out that some of the 
exempted countries are the “biggest” exporters of steel and aluminum to the US. 
According to the department the exempted countries accounted for 58% of steel 
imports and 49% of aluminum imports to the US in 2017. “South Africa is therefore 
not a cause of any national security concerns in the US nor a threat to US industry 
interests and is not the cause of the global steel glut.” “Instead, South Africa finds 
itself as collateral damage in the trade war of key global economies. South Africa is 
concerned by the unfairness of the measures and that it is one of the countries that 
are singled out as a contributor to US national security concerns when its exports of 
aluminum and steel products are not that significant,” the DTI complained 27. 
 
 
Further possible effects of a global trade war for African producers  
 
Whether the U.S. would win a trade war, triggered by the new U.S. protectionism as 
president Trump maintained28, is open to question. Presumably all affected countries 
would suffer. However, predictions on the outcome are highly speculative, especially 
if collateral damages or benefits of trade diversion provoked by higher tariffs are 
considered. Under certain conditions the trade dispute could even produce positive 
externalities for African producers. 
 
For example, the retaliatory tariffs of up to 25 percent imposed by China on U.S. 
agricultural imports could result in collateral benefits for major competitors to the U.S. 
in citrus and wine imports to China. Australia would probably benefit most, but also, 
though to a lesser extent, South Africa and Egypt29. In addition, in case that the new 
U.S. import tariffs should reduce the global steel price on stock markets, further 
positive externalities for African iron ore exporters like South Africa might develop in 
the commodity financial markets 30.  
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2. Ambiguous role of African agency in fostering participatory trade and 
development  
 
African Civil Society Organizations as driver of change  
 
The current dispute on the negative impact of Trump’s tariffs is only the most recent 
manifestation of a longstanding controversy between African countries and their 
Western trading partners. The debate was confined by the framework of the Cotonou 
Agreement (2000), a cornerstone of EU-ACP31 development cooperation on the one 
hand, and limiting WTO rules on the other. The Cotonou Agreement was built already 
on generations of cooperation treaties since 1963, when most African countries had 
gained independence. At this time, the European Economic Community (EEC) 
developed a first generation of economic cooperation agreements, mainly with 
French-speaking African countries, the so called Yaoundé Convention32, later-on 
extended to the Lomé Convention (1975-1999). The new EU-ACP partnership is not 
restricted to governments. Civil society organizations, can participate too, as well as 
economic and social partners and the private sector.  
 
Fortunately enough, social movements in Europe and Africa have arisen to contest 
imperial globality, fostering forms of counter-hegemonic praxis and politics against 
the imposition of neoliberal globalization (Prempeh, 2006). The ongoing EPAs 
controversy on the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) between the EU and 
Africa and the increasing impact of African agency on negotiations with the EU is a 
prominent example (Kohnert, 2014).  
 
Building up civic agency33 is not only crucial for a sustainable process of 
democratization but also for foreign trade on a level playing field. The development 
potential of civic agency in African countries and elsewhere depends on internal and 
external variables which are interdependent. The domestic factor rests to a large 
extent on the capacity of citizens to overcome fault lines of ethnicity, class, gender, 
religion and partisan politics in their own country. However, this domestic capacity 
can be enhanced also by global developments and networks like the spread of 
internet and mobile phones even in remote regions all over Africa, by international 
                                                                                                                                                        
tariffs reduce global  steel  price?  Response from  stock markets around the world. The University of Texas Rio 
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continuum from a local to a global order.  
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advocacy networks, and last but not least by motivating successful protest 
movements in neighboring countries, like the Arab spring or the wave of Sovereign 
National Conferences in Sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s. 
 
Foreign influence on the development capacity of civic agency, both positive and 
negative, is often indirect and accidentally, but not necessarily less effective. In many 
cases it is not visible at first sight, notably when it comes to its long-term effects. 
More often than not, it slips in under the radar screen of even well-intended aid-
donors because the institutional memory both of development agencies and related 
research and evaluation institutions is usually quite short (Bierschenk / Elwert / 
Kohnert 1993). In contrast, the aftermath of misguided development policies and 
failed development projects remains often embodied in the memory of the local 
population concerned over generations. However, its long-lasting impact is 
considered by the donors only occasionally if at all (Kohnert 2017). 
 
We can draw valuable lessons from civic agency in the realm of participatory trade 
politics in West Africa and elsewhere. They date back up to the Seattle protests of 
1999, which became a global symbol of civic agency by questioning the legitimacy of 
the WTO order. This was shown by Silke Trommer (2014) in her painstaking study of 
West African civil society organizations (CSOs) as symbols and innovative drivers of 
transparency and democratization in ECOWAS’s EPA negotiations. Originating in the 
late 1990s, “national platforms of civil society organizations” dealing with ACP–EU 
relations have, since 2006, become officially recognized by, and deeply involved in 
ECOWAS–EU talks. Fluctuating over time, these CSOs  comprised 15 organizations 
from 11 West African countries (in 2009) composed of a vast variety of groups, such 
as farmers’ associations, local and transnational NGOs, trade unions, women’s rights 
associations, etc. Each national member was responsible for lobbying at its 
respective national level. Although the degree of legitimacy and representativeness 
varies considerably among members, together they wield a remarkable political, 
social and economic influence, including access to core trade policymaking 
institutions like ECOWAS and the official EPA negotiation table.  
 
 
African Agency as impediment to sustainable development  
 
Unfortunately however, more often than not, African agency has been impeding 
sustainable trade and development of African countries, as will be shown in the 
following. In comparison, the set-back that Trump’s protective tariffs effects on US-
African trade-relationships is by far less important than self-inflicted barriers of 
African agency, namely large-scale corruption, nepotism, and mismanagement on all 
levels of politics, economy and society. Scholarly studies of these impediments of 
development and the peculiarities of African ‘states at work’ are legions (Bierschenk 
et al 2014; Justesen & Bjørnskov 2014; Blundo & Sardan 2006). However, let us be 
clear about it right from the start: African institutions or individuals are not the only 
11 
 
one to blame for this, more often than not they are closely entangled with their 
Western counterparts. 
 
Informal institutions play a decisive role in African bureaucracies, politics, economy 
and society. However, there exists nothing like a typical African culture of corruption, 
clientelism or mismanagement. Most cases of grand corruption in Africa for example 
have been instigated by globally acting corporations34. This was beneficial for the 
briber too in many respects, not just to secure lucrative business contracts. In 
Germany, for example, the tax office classified bribes as so-called ‘useful expenses’ 
up to 1997. Therefore, they could be deducted as business expenses from the tax. 
The only precondition was that the recipient abroad was named. Most industrialized 
nations had similar regulations35. The trend to treat bribes to foreign officials ever 
since as illegal does not necessarily mean that grand corruption has been confined.  
 
Besides, even African ethnic patronage relations are neither primordial nor divisive 
but instead continually adapted to modern requirements (Meagher 2006). Seemingly 
static cultural factors, such as custom, tradition, religion, or ethnicity, have been re-
invented or adapted to changing requirements of societies. Therefore, it would be 
misleading to put the blame for lacking development in Africa on the cultural heritage, 
as supposedly incorporated in “traditional African institutions”, which are frequently 
considered in a simplistic and deterministic manner as customary barrier to 
democratization or economic growth. In addition, there exist significant structural 
differences not only between cultures of innovations of the formal and the informal 
sector, but also within the informal sector, depending on its social structure. Both 
differences have serious repercussions with regard to the developmental trajectory. 
Last, but not least, the fault lines between the formal and the informal become 
increasingly blurred in various ways by globalization. This has been demonstrated 
with respect to different standards for culturally induced innovations between the so-
called “useful” and “useless” development regions  by Ferguson (2006:380), who 
took “governance” and investment criteria concerning strategic investments of oil-
multinationals as examples. The enclaves of the “useful” Africa are not any longer 
delimitated either by national frontiers, or by the divide between the formal and 
informal, but by boundaries of transnational economic and social spaces. The chains 
of transnational enclaves of “useful Africa”, e.g. of oil fields exploited by oil 
multinationals in West Africa (often backed by powerful hidden national interest), 
function apparently according to rules and ethics beyond the official discourse on 
governance or on codes of conduct of international development cooperation. The 
poor in these regions are regularly excluded from the “useful Africa”, as shown by the 
                                                 
34
 A recent example was the prosecution of French billionaire Vincent Bolloré, owner of one of the largest 
transport and logistic operators  in Africa, for ’bribing foreign public officials’ in Lomé and Conacry, in order to 
obtain two lucrative container terminals in Lomé and Conacry. Agnew, H. (2018): Vincent Bolloré in French 
police custody after Africa probe. Billionaire detained as part of bribery investigation London: Financial Times, 
April 24, 2018  
35
 OECD (2011): Update on tax legislation on the tax treatment of bribes to foreign public officials in countries 
parties to the OECD anti-bribery convention. Paris: June 2011.  
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example of the Niger Delta. They have to obey special laws, which result in their 
exclusion and marginalization within the context of globalized capitalism.  
 
 
Obstructing African agency: the example of the Ajaokuta Steel Mill Project, Nigeria 
 
The Ajaokuta Steel Mill project is the second largest steel mill in Africa, and the 12th 
largest in the world. However, at the same time it is one of the most notorious ‘white 
elephants’ in Africa too (SaharaReporters, 2018; Faboyede, O.E. 2015). Construction 
started in 1979 under a co-operation agreement with the former Soviet Union on 
24,000 hectares in Ajjaokuta, Kogi State, Central Nigeria. The project has four 
different types of rolling mills inside the plant to produce different steel products. Its 
coke oven and by-product plants, allegedly completed in 1994 to up to 98%, or 40 or 
43 plants, were bigger than all similar plants in Nigeria combined. In order to supply 
the mill with iron ore and connect it with the world market, Nigeria's first standard 
gauge railway was built from the iron mines at Itakpe to the steel mill at Ajaokuta and 
continuing to the Atlantic Ocean at Warri. The railway was nearly completed toot, but 
part of it was vandalized in the meant-time (Ajaokuta Steel Mill, wikipedia). 
 
Ajaokuta would have had the capacity to become one of the major African producers 
of industrial machineries, auto-electrical spare-parts, shipbuilding, railways and 
carriages, as well as biggest African supplier, not just for neighboring African 
markets. In the first phase of its development the plant would have provided direct 
employment for 10,000 workers and further 500,000 up- and downstream if in 
operation. When, after several failed attempts of privatization, the Nigerian 
government took back control in 2016, it had spent an estimated US $10 billion over 
34 years on the project. However, not a single sheet of iron has been produced till 
date because of gross mismanagement, fraud and vandalisation of the plant in the 
course of failed privatization efforts (Faboyede, O.E. 2015). About another $ 1.5 
billion would be necessary to complete the remaining two per cent of the plant 
(Oluyole, F. 2017; Ajaokuta Steel Mill, wikipedia). That is, $625 million to complete 
the steel company and another $ 800 million to provide the external infrastructure, 
including railway, for the complex, to make it operational36. Yet, apparently some 
ministers in the former Goodluck Jonathan as well as in the present incumbent 
Muhammadu Buhari’s administration were again trying to fraudulently acquire the 
Ajaokuta steel company for themselves, as was revealed in a detailed petition read at 
the House of Representatives in Abuja in March 2018 (SaharaReporters, 2018). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                 
36
 today-ng (2018): Ajaokuta Steel Company: $652m estimated to reactivate equipment, machines. By News 
Agency of Nigeria, June 7, 2018; Adeolu, Yemisi (2018): Official: Nigeria needs $1.425 billion to complete 
Ajaokuta Steel. Today-ng, June 5, 2018    
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African states still strive to cope with the legacy of the slave trade, colonialism, and 
the subsequent struggle for political and economic independence in a crisis prone 
continent. Decades of development aid and well-intentioned though not necessarily 
altruistic treaties to promote development by trade, like the for mentioned AGOA and 
the ACP-EU Cotonou agreement which runs out in 2020, were steps in the right 
direction. Yet, they apparently had little effect to accelerate the development process 
in Africa up to now. The present move of the Trump administration to put ‘America 
first’ and to concentrate on the ‘real friends’ of the US, seems to be a step backward 
to the times of the cold war, according to the maxim, if you’re not with us, you’re 
against us37. The punitive tariffs introduced among others on imports from African 
countries means blunt power politics without regard to the needs of African 
developing countries. Yet, unlike competing global players, targeted by Trump, 
African states lack the power to retaliate. It is a slap in the face of those bona fide 
Africans who thought there would be more level playing field with the US, at least 
since the AGOA-treaty and the great expectations aroused by the Obama-
administration (Laymann et al 2009).  
 
Nonetheless, African institutions are no passive agents who sit mesmerized like 
rabbits before the snake vis à vis any move of the US government. African agency 
matters, despite popular misconceptions about  global players as agenda setters that 
still prevail, whereas Africans are considered as more or less helplessly overrun and 
outwitted. On the contrary, local agency and class policy are central determinants of 
socio-economic transformations. African agency from below can develop under 
certain conditions to social and economic change of revolutionary proportions as the 
‘Arab spring revolutions’ showed, just as the surprisingly successful role of civic 
agency in the EPA negotiations (Kohnert, 2014). On the other hand, the closed shop 
of the ‘Messieurs Afrique’ in Francophone Africa (Kohnert, 2005) as well as an 
‘agency as corruption’ (Taylor, 2014), incarnated by the Nigerian example of decades 
of bad governance, both to the benefit of political and economic elites in Africa and 
overseas, still constitute an effective barrier to sustainable African development.   
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Appendix  
 
Table 1. Top US imports of steel by country, and % of change, 2011-2017  
 
Note: South Africa ranked 20. with US $ 0.3 bn in 2017 -  behind Thailand, Spain and Austria; accessed: 30.03.2018  
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Table 2: Car Imports by Country  
(15 countries that imported the highest dollar value worth of cars, 2017): 
 
    United States: US$179.6 billion (23.9% of total imported cars) 
    Germany: $58.5 billion (7.8%) 
    China: $49.9 billion (6.6%) 
    United Kingdom: $44.1 billion (5.9%) 
    Belgium: $36.4 billion (4.8%) 
    France: $34.7 billion (4.6%) 
    Italy: $31.2 billion (4.1%) 
    Canada: $28.7 billion (3.8%) 
    Spain: $20.2 billion (2.7%) 
    Australia: $17.5 billion (2.3%) 
    Netherlands: $12.8 billion (1.7%) 
    Mexico: $11.5 billion (1.5%) 
    Japan: $11.1 billion (1.5%) 
    Switzerland: $10.5 billion (1.4%) 
    Austria: $10.1 billion (1.3%) 
 
Source: World’s top exports - The listed 15 countries purchased almost three-quarters (74%) of all cars imported during 2017. 
Among the above countries, the fastest-growing markets for cars since 2013 were: Spain (up 78%), Italy (up 54.3%), Germany 
(up 42.3%) and Mexico (up 36.2%). Only one top country posted a decline in its imported car purchases, namely Australia via its 
modest -0.9% dip from 2016 to 2017. 
 
Table 3: Car Imports into the United States  
Below are the top 15 suppliers from which the United States imported the highest dollar value worth of 
cars during 2017. Within parenthesis is the % change in value for each supplying country since 2013. 
 
    Canada: US$43.8 billion (up 0.1% from 2013) 
    Japan: $40.7 billion (up 4.9%) 
    Mexico: $30.6 billion (up 49.4%) 
    Germany: $20.8 billion (down -19.8%) 
    South Korea: $16.1 billion (up 29.1%) 
    United Kingdom: $8.8 billion (up 71%) 
    Italy: $5.1 billion (up 221.1%) 
    Sweden: $2.2 billion (up 203.3%) 
    Slovakia: $2 billion (up 123.3%) 
    China: $1.8 billion (up 1,759%) 
    Hungary: $1.2 billion (up 202.7%) 
    Finland: $1.2 billion (up 11,883%) 
    South Africa: $1.1 billion (down -50.4%) 
    Turkey: $911.8 million (up 666.5%) 
    Spain: $816.9 million (up 4,572%) 
 
Source: World’s top exports - The listed 15 countries shipped 98.6% of all American cars imports in 2017.Among the above 
countries, the fastest-growing suppliers of cars to Spain since 2013 were: Finland (up 11,883%), Spain (up 4,572%), China (up 
1,759%) and Turkey (up 666.5%). 
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Map 1: US Steel imports, 2017  
 
   
 
 
Map 2: US-imports of bauxite and aluminum by country (2004)  
 
  
 
Note: Of the seven African countries listed, only three, South Africa, Egypt and Ghana exported aluminum to the USA to any 
significant degree. Imports from Kenya, Liberia, Morocco, Niger and Somalia were negligible. Source: "Countries Compared by 
Economy > Trade > With US > US imports of bauxite and aluminum. International Statistics at NationMaster.com", 
FTDWebMaster, Foreign Trade Division, U.S. Census Bureau. Aggregates compiled by NationMaster. Retrieved from 
http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Economy/Trade/With-US/US-imports-of-bauxite-and-aluminum      
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Map 3: U.S. imports of cars, 2017  
 
 
Source: https://www.statista.com/chart/13248/us-import-partners-for-cars/  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
